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ABSTRACT. Derrida is, perhaps, the foremost philosopher of the humanities and of 
its place in the university. Over the long period of his career he has been concerned 
with the fate, status, place and contribution of the humanities. Through his decon- 
structive readings and writings he has done much not only to reinvent the Western 
tradition by attending closely to those texts which constitute it but also he has 
redefined its procedures and protocols, questioning and commenting upon the 
relationship between commentary and interpretation, the practice of quotation, the 
delimitation of a work and its singularity, its signature, and its context – the whole 
form of life of literary culture, together with textual practices and conventions that 
shape it. From his very early work he has occupied a marginal in-between space –
simultaneously, textual, literary, philosophical, and political – a space that permitted 
him a freedom to question, to speculate and to draw new limits to humanitas. Derrida 
has demonstrated his power to reconceptualize and to reimagine the humanities in 
the space of the contemporary university. This paper discusses Derrida’s tasks for 
the new humanities (Trifonas & Peters, 2005). 
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An appreciation of Derrida’s work can shed light on the growth and clash of 
fundamentalisms and on the new moralizers who based their authority on an 
unforgiving literalism and humanism. The spirit of this paper is directed 
against the new moralizers be they fundamentalist of any persuasion (Chris- 
tian, Muslim or Jewish), old unreformed classical liberal humanists, new 
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humanists, secular or Christian, still searching for a theory of human nature 
on which to hang their sermons, or simply those neoconservative humanists 
who having rallied against an amorphous and unnamed nihilistic “post- 
modernism” falsely attributing the doctrine to Nietzsche or to his heirs. The 
new moralizers constitute a revival of an exclusive and foundational human- 
ism demonstrating all the political and spiritual dangers of a set of essentialist 
beliefs in human nature – a unified theory or theology of our spiritual origin 
– from which is derived the “who” and what “we” are, the moral code “we” 
should follow, and both who belongs to the “we” and how those who belong 
should treat non-believers. In the USA, UK and elsewhere, the term “the new 
moralizers” has been consistently applied to the social conservatives that 
have brought a new vision of morality based on a view of human nature and 
made it central to public policy, making determinations of individual virtue 
fundamental to welfare entitlement (Super, 2004). This shift in public policy 
paradigm has also been accompanied by the growth of conservative politics 
that has drawn upon the politicization of fundamentalist Christian groups 
going back to Ronald Reagan’s administration.  
The term “fundamentalism” itself originates in the late nineteenth century 
as a movement by evangelic Christians, against modernism, to affirm a set of 
“fundamental” beliefs, namely “the five fundamentals” – the inspiration of 
the Bible by the Holy Spirit, the virgin birth, the belief that Christ’s death 
was an atonement for sin, the bodily resurrection and the historical reality of 
Christ’s miracles. The new fundamentalism in American politics began with 
Robert Grant’s Christian Cause in the mid 1970s and Jerry Falwell’s Moral 
Majority in the 1980s. Fundamentalism now has been used to describe both 
Islamic fundamentalism and Jewish fundamentalism (Shahak & Mezvinsky, 
1999; Ruthven, 2004; Sim, 2004). In each case, these fundamentalisms are a 
reaction to an atheistic modernism and advocate a return to Christian, Islamic, 
Judaic values, law, beliefs and practices. In each case also this implies a set 
of literalist convictions in relation to scripture or sacred texts and a belief in 
the unmediated truth of the word. Literalism has a privileged place in these 
belief systems: language is always taken in a non-figurative sense. In its 
strictest sense scriptural literalism is a denial of allegory, parable or metaphor. 
On this basis fundamentalism often implies a set of beliefs in an onto-
theological story of creation, man’s nature and place, and the biological and 
social roles of men, women, and children. Scholars have applied the notion 
also to non-secular groups such as the militant animal rights activists, 
fundamentalist nationalisms or ethnicities such as Le Pen’s National Front in 
France, and even, neo-liberals as “market fundamentalists” (Sim, 2004; 
Thompson, 2006).  
Derrida, both the man and his work, represents an ongoing struggle against 
all fundamentalisms, against all easy definitions, dogmas, and literalisms that 
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proclaim truth and universalism on the basis of religious and supernatural 
explanations of the origins of the world. His own background born into a 
Sephardic Jewish family near Algiers immediately calls into question his 
own identity as “French” and “Jewish.” He experienced anti-semitism in the 
French Algerian school system still under Vichy laws; the marginalization 
and “feeling of nonbelonging,” as Brian Reilly (2006: 498) points out, “would 
come to affect all areas of his life.” Reilly (2006: 498) continues: 
 
With the tools he acquired while living in the margins of identity, 
Derrida offered radical critiques that challenged the stability of 
origins; he displaced and transgressed border by refusing exclusive 
definitions. 
 
His historical formation and self-understanding stands all against all funda- 
mentalisms and foundationalisms. He recognized with Nietzsche the inescapable 
autobiographical elements that insinuates itself into interpretation marked by 




How does one represent Derrida and his writing? The linguistic notion of 
representation is central to Derrida’s work and to his critique of Western 
metaphysics. He is suspicious of the view that language represents the world, 
at least in any straightforward sense. But “representation” is also important 
to him as a political principle indicating the ethical and political stakes in 
presenting an argument or representing a people, a text, an image, or (one’s 
relation to) another thinker – the so-called “politics of representation.” Not 
least, the word “representation” captures his concerns for the genres of auto- 
biography and confession, of philosophy as a certain kind of writing, of the 
“personal voice,” and of the signature. Derrida is also careful of journalists 
and tends to refuse most invitations for interviews, especially by the popular 
press. Paradoxically, Points … Interviews, 1974–1994 (Derrida, 1995), a col- 
lection, consisting of twenty-three interviews given over the course of the 
last two decades, provides a good introduction to Derrida (see especially his 
“The Work of Intellectuals and the Press”).  
Perhaps, more than any philosopher before him, and from his earliest 
beginnings, Jacques Derrida has called attention to the form of “philosophical 
discourse” – its “modes of composition, its rhetoric, its metaphors, its 
language, its fictions,” as he says – not in order to assimilate philosophy to 
literature but rather to recognize the complex links between the two and to 
investigate the ways in which the institutional authority of academic philos- 
ophy, and the autonomy it claims, rests upon a “disavowal with relation to its 
own language.” (His doctoral thesis based on an investigation of Joyce 
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purported investigated “The Ideality of the Literary Object.”) The question 
of philosophical styles, he maintains, is itself, a philosophical question. 
“Deconstruction,” the term most famously associated with Derrida, is a 
practice of reading and writing, a mode of analysis and criticism that 
depends deeply upon an interpretation of the question of style. In this Derrida 
follows a Nietzschean-Heideggerian line of thought that repudiates Platonism 
as the source of all metaphysics in the West from St Paul to Kant, Mill and 
Marx. Where Heidegger still sees in Nietzsche the last strands of an inverted 
Platonism, tied to the metaphysics of the will to power, and pictures himself 
as the first genuinely post-metaphysical thinker, Derrida, in his turn, while 
acknowledging his debt, detects in Heidegger’s notion of Being a residual 
and nostalgic vestige of metaphysics. He agrees with Heidegger that the 
most important philosophical task is to break free from the “logocentrism” of 
Western philosophy – the self-presence, immediacy and univocity – that 
clouds our view and manifests its nihilistic impulses in Western culture. And 
yet “breaking free” does not mean overcoming metaphysics. Deconstruction 
substitutes a critical practice focused upon texts for the ineffable or the 
inexpressible. It does so, not by trying to escape the metaphysical character 
of language but by exposing and undermining it: by fixing upon accidental 
features of the text to subvert its essential message and by playing off its 
rhetorical elements against its grammatical structure. Heidegger’s strategy for 
getting beyond “man” will not do the trick: Derrida suggests that “a change 
of style” is needed, one which will “speak several languages and produce 
several texts at once,” as he says in an early essay, “The Ends of Man” 
(Derrida, 1982). 
Derrida’s work reflects and engages with the tradition of Western meta- 
physics going back to Plato promoting an understanding of the critique of 
phallogocentrism as a response to the Western metaphysical tradition. Derrida 
systematically engages with the Western tradition with a humanity, passion, 
generosity and with patient and stunning scholarship. Phallogocentrism (along 
with logocentrism and Eurocentrism) refer to the privileging not just of 
European culture over all others but more deeply to the Western metaphysical 
tradition that holds to a hierarchy of values sustained by a binary logic that 
cannot do otherwise than privilege one term over another (reality/appearance, 
speech/writing, presence/absence, identity/difference, life/death). It is the 
general economy of an inherited humanism propping up all the ideological 
remnants of Man in his essence and all of the substitutions played out since 
Nietzsche that deconstruction seeks to destabilize, unmask and undermine. 
Deconstruction, going beyond Abbau and Destruktion, works to undo “the 
metaphysics of presence” which holds that thought and speech (the logos) is 
the privileged center through which all discourse and meaning are derived. 
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Gott ist tot (God is dead) is the shorthand that Nietzsche uses to proclaim this 
deepening of humanism. The “madman” in The Gay Science pronounces: 
 
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How 
shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What 
was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has 
bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? 
What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the 
greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not 
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (Section 125). 
 
God can no longer act as a source or foundation for moral authority so what 
now can conceivably anchor the system of values? Nietzsche’s observation 
heralds a new secularism in Europe and the end of the effective history of 
the Church. At least, this is how Heidegger interprets it. The proposition 
“God is dead” as he says “has nothing to do with the assertion of an ordinary 
atheism. It means: The supersensible world, more especially the world of the 
Christian God, has lost its effective force in history” (Heidegger, 1985: 485). 
What would it mean to talk of Europe without God, or that the Christian God 
had become unbelievable, especially after the experiences of the WWI and 
WWII? On what could a replacement code be based? Moral law derivable 
from our own rationality? The beginning of liberal humanism and the turn to 
subjectivity with Descartes and Kant? A kind of naturalism advocated by 
Hume, that is, a natural sympathy for others? Or should one give up on the 
search for foundations altogether and deny that moral codes and beliefs have 




Nietzsche’s legacy is still very much a part of the contemporary intellectual 
landscape and he generates diametrically opposite appropriate of his work 
that define the context for the present debate about the role and status of the 
humanities. All the works of major philosophers have their “right” and “left” 
interpreters and defenders – this is true of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Witt- 
genstein (indeed, of Plato himself). The modern quarrel in the humanities 
has been read often as a struggle over Nietzsche by a “right” Leo Strauss and 
a “left” Jacques Derrida. Peter Levine (1995: xviii–xix), for instance, argues 
that “Strauss and his followers are essentially duplicitous writers, holding an 
exoteric, conservative doctrine for the herd, and an esoteric, postmodern 
position for their übermenschlich readers.” He argues that Alan Bloom and 
the Straussians are not genuine conservatives for they do not hold that the 
Western canon contain the accumulated wisdom of the Western tradition. By 
contrast, Levine argues that Derrida occupies the opposite end of the spectrum, 
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a thinker who “saves” Nietzsche from Heidegger’s reading of him as the 
“last metaphysician” only to herald Nietzsche as the first non-metaphysical 
thinker who helps to fashion Derrida’s deconstructive practice recognizing 
that logocentrism or “the metaphysics of phonetic writing” is “a contingent 
but inescapable value” (p. 169). 
Nietzsche is certainly central to the “quarrel” in the humanities today and 
in a real sense we can take Strauss and Derrida as representing opposite ends 
of the spectrum. Allan Bloom was drawn increasingly to criticize decon- 
struction not only on the basis of its interpretation of Nietzsche and to 
develop a conception of literature that differed from Derrida’s. Bloom (1987: 
379) described deconstruction as a “predictable…fad” based on a “cheap- 
ened interpretation of Nietzsche” and as “a dogmatic, academic nihilism of 
the Left” (Bloom, 1990: 28). In this connection we should not forget that 
Nietzsche, Derrida and deconstruction, Foucault, and “postmodernism” were 
at the very heart of American debate surrounding the humanities during the 
chairmanship of the National Endowment for the Humanities by Lynne 
Cheney (wife of the Vice President) from 1986 to 1993. American Memory: 
A Report on the Humanities in the Nation’s Public Schools (Cheney, 1987) 
warned about the failure of schools to transmit knowledge of the past to 
future generations, and Telling the Truth (Cheney, 1996) examined the alleged 
effects of postmodernism and relativism in academia and politics.  
Nietzsche’s critique of morality and in particular his attack on prevailing 
conceptions of moral agency based on notions of free will, self-transparency 
and moral sameness (one code applying universally to all), begins to work 
historically to erode the moral certainty that invests fundamentalist forms of 
Christian humanism and acts as a source of critique for those theorists who 
wish to expose the illusion of bourgeois morality or the thin veil of ignorance 
that cloak religious teachings. Existentialism, in Sartre’s famous phrase, is a 
humanism, and many who followed Nietzsche and/or Kierkegaard tended to 
give up on an objective or universal account of moral law or behavior to 
embrace a mode or way of being. Meaning is a product and outcome of 
existence so no formal account can be given in advance and certainly not an 
account derived from the nature of human beings or indeed any pre-given 
framework of ideas. Human existence cannot be approached in the same way 
as we approach things in terms of concepts or categories that we apply to 
understanding the external world. The question of self-description or self-
examination or self-interpretation is crucial such that I cannot be dissociated 
from an account of what I am.  
I present Derrida as a profound humanist, who committed to the value of 
truth and the promise of humanity endeavors to steer us away from its easy 
ideological fabrications that ultimately only supports a very tawdry and 
temporary cultural image of ourselves in one particular historical period. I 
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present him so because he stands in a tradition not only within both con- 
temporary modern traditions influence by Nietzsche-Heidegger nexus and 
the immediate French tradition dating from Kojève’s lectures on Hegel but 
also in terms of the immediate inheritance from Sartre and his associates as 
well as Levinas, Blanchot, Althusser, and his many contemporaries including 
Deleuze, Lyotard, Kofmann, and Foucault. Clearly, one has to say also the 
modern tradition from Descartes and Kant, and, indeed, the tradition all the 
way back to Plato. I do not want to suggest a unity or origin of tradition but 
perhaps sustaining threads of a complex skein and we must then also embrace 
the Hebraic tradition and various modern literary movements as well as 
those in the European avant-garde. By calling Derrida a profound humanist I 
mean to indicate that Derrida engages directly and systematically with the 
question of humanism – what it is to be human and its limits and boundaries 
in technology and animality – and with its continuance by some means. Thus, 
a continuance through its encompassing of new extensions and mutations of 
rights in international law, in democracy to come, in the right to philosophize, 
in the author/writer/reader, in tasks for the new humanities, in an ethics of 
the Other – of hospitality – in the changed conditions for scholarship and 
media, in the promise of Europe in providing an alternative vision for world 




The American reception of deconstruction begins with the essay “Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” Derrida delivered to 
the International Colloquium on Critical Languages and the Sciences of Man 
at John Hopkins University in October 1966. It was a prestigious event in- 
volving the participation of renowned French thinkers such as Jean Hyppolite, 
Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, Lucien Goldman, Georges 
Poulet and others. In the Preface to the proceedings, the editors Richard 
Macksey and Eugenio Donato (1970: x), describe the conference as “the first 
time in the United States that structuralist thought had been considered as a 
cross-disciplinary phenomenon.” Of the proceedings, only a paragraph in 
Macksey’s Concluding Remarks signals the importance of Derrida’s “radical 
reappraisals of our [structuralist] assumptions” (p. 320). 
In the now classic essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences” Derrida (1978: 279–280) questions the “structurality of 
structure” or notion of “center” which has served to limit the play of structure. 
He writes: 
 
. . . the entire history of the concept of structure . . . must be 
thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a 
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linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a 
regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. 
The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the 
history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix . . . is the 
determination of being as presence in all senses of this word. It 
could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable 
presence – eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, 
substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, 
man, and so forth. 
 
He suggests that conceptual resources for the “decentering” of structure, of 
the transcendental signified, can be found in Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger 
and he distinguishes two interpretations: one, Hegelian in origin and exem- 
plified in Lévi-Strauss’ work, “dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin 
which escapes play and the order of the sign” and seeks the “inspiration of a 
new humanism;” the other, based on “Nietzschean affirmation, that is the 
joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, 
the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, without 
origin which is offered to an active interpretation,” passes beyond man and 
humanism (Derrida, 1978: 292). As he explains “The paradox is that the 
metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. 
The opposition is systematic with the reduction” (Derrida, 1978: 281). By 
defining itself against the philosophies of consciousness (e.g., existentialism), 
structuralism participates in shaping itself in relation to those philosophies 




It is not entirely surprising that at the beginning of the twentieth first century 
two towering figures dedicate themselves to defining the meaning of human- 
ism and attempt to renew humanistic scholarship: Jacques Derrida, an Alger- 
ian “French” Jew, and Edward Said, a Palestinian Christian. Both immensely 
literate men are responsible, though in different ways, for altering the course 
of scholarship in the humanities and for introducing a new set of critical 
practices that mark out a philosophical extension and ethical revitalization of 
the meaning of literature, philosophy, and criticism. Through “orientalism,” 
a concept that laid bare the ethnocentrism of Western assumption about the 
East, Said at once extended the work of Foucault and Derrida into the arena 
of post-colonial theory, demonstrating how exoticized and romantic images 
disguised the imperial basis of colonial rule. He argued how orientalism 
functions to harbor a persistent Western bias and prejudice against Arab 
Islamic peoples and their cultures. In essence his work exposed the systematic 
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alliance between the Enlightenment and colonialism while embracing a 
secular humanism himself that denied comfort to fundamentalists of all 
persuasions.  
When asked “What humanism is possible?” Said (2001) responded: 
 
the difficulty to begin with is that humanism in many ways is 
discredited. It has participated in, for example, systems like 
apartheid and colonialism that were exported to the non-European 
world by European thinkers and powers who thought they were 
doing humanism’s work – civilizing the natives and bringing the 
benefits of Western technology to the peripheries. And of course 
in this process they brought racial discrimination, racial hierarchies, 
and systems of exploitation, which were established in the interests 
of a humanism that said, ‘We are the bearers of an advanced 
culture and we should have the benefits of that even if it means 
subjugating lesser people.’ The whole concept of ‘lesser’ civiliza- 
tions and so on is, unfortunately, one of the burdens that humanism 
has to bear. 
 
In his posthumous work, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Said defines 
humanism in a deconstructive way as “the practice of participatory citizen- 
ship” whose “purpose is to make more things available to critical scrutiny” 
and thus disclose its “human misreading and misinterpretations of a collective 
past and present” (p. 22). Said confirms that a form of humanism is still 
possible and his radical humanism draws on a form of democratic criticism 
based on self-knowledge, self-criticism, and the attempt to emancipate, 
enlighten and educate. 
Derrida, by comparison, also took on political work even although his 
detractors painted him as someone removed from the world of political 
action. This is a claim I examine in Chapter 4. Said himself dismissed 
Derrida’s playfulness and insisted on the historical embeddedness of the text. 
Perhaps, Said was more committed to the rationalist tradition, to the in- 
dividual, to philology, and to Vico’s notion of self-knowledge and rhetoric. 
Yet both were displaced and both experienced the colonial condition early 
on. Both agree that humanism is not only still possible but imperative that 
we must search for viable forms that revitalize the humanities and reclaims 
for it an more active role in the public sphere. 
There is no doubt that the humanities need new tasks and Derrida has 
sought to provide a programmatic picture. That the humanities must also 
contextualize itself, escaping its local origins and trajectories, and broaden 
its account to take in the radical pluralism that exists as part of a new 
globalism that also recognizes the claims of local autonomy made by first 
peoples, indigenous peoples, sub-state cultural minorities, international 
religious movements, youth cultures, gender groups, and all sorts of political 
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associations. Here the question of self and other looms large, as do questions 
revolving centrally around notion of ethics and politics. Derrida provides us 
with the rejuvenation of ancient concepts of friendship, the ethics of hos- 
pitality, forgiveness, the gift, the invitation, that outlines his account of 




For Derrida the unconditionality of the university without conditions is 
deemed to have close links to the “humanities” to the extent that relates to 
two historical ideas: the rights of man (human rights), and crimes against 
humanity. The university without conditions does not exist, but it presup- 
poses a place of critical resistance, a form of dissidence. This is its strength 
and also its vulnerability, what enables it to be bypassed or recuperated by 
instance of power. Within the university, professors profess, perform acts of 
profession. Derrida relates profession to confession in terms of the general 
structure of any performative – promising, witnessing, etc. – and in order to 
relate professing to an act of faith, which in turn relates to the structure of 
literary fiction that takes the form of a performative than a constative set of 
utterances, as well as to what he calls a “politics of the virtual.” He also 
alludes to the proliferation of forms of confession currently evident in public 
and private discourse. 
The task of the humanities to come would be “ad infinitu, to know and to 
think their own history in terms of professing, the theology and history of 
work, knowledge and faith in knowledge, the questions of man, of the world, 
of fiction of the performative, of the ‘as if’, of literature, and of the oeuvre, 
etc.” He advances seven programmatic (and telegrammatic) tasks for the 
humanities: 
 
1. The history and figure of what is proper to man (e.g., especially 
in terms of the traditional opposition between man and animal), 
via the rights of man and the idea of crimes against humanity; 
2. The history and style of sovereignty – that of the humanities 
themselves, but also questions of international law, the limits of 
the nation-state, relations between man and woman; 
3. The history of professing and the profession (and confession) as 
it relates to democracy; 
4. The history of the concept of literature, its links with the per- 
formative ‘as if,’ oeuvre, author, signature, national language, etc. 
5. The relation of professing to the profession of faith and the 
production of performatives and ‘oeuvres;’ 
6. The history of that very relation between performative and 
constative, to begin with via Austin, but also in terms of the limits 
of the Austinian distinction. 
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7. Note a sabbatical! To let arrive ‘the very thing that, by arriving, 
revolutionise, overturns, and puts to rout the very authority that is 
attached, in the university, in the humanities, to a) knowledge, b) 
the profession and profession of faith, c) the performative putting 
to work of the ‘as if’. Where there is a performative, an ‘event’ 
cannot arrive; only the impossible can arrive. This idea has been 
discussed in terms of invention, the gift, forgiveness, hospitality, 
justice, friendship, etc. in recent work, and is not without relation 
here to the ‘perhaps’ or ‘as if’ of professing of/in the humanities to 
the extent that that implies an exposure to the unforeseen limit, 
outside, future: ‘if this impossible that I’m talking about were to 
arrive perhaps one day, I leave you to imagine the consequences. 
Take your time but be quick about it because you do not know 
what awaits you.’ 
 
I take it that the legacy of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity for Derrida is to 
point us towards recognizing the twin dangers to the university and to 
understanding German idealism and the Kantian idea of the university in a 
critical sense within a context transformed by global capitalism. This theme 
is creatively explored in terms of the performative acts of profession and the 
humanities as the site and production of performative “works” in the sense 
of oeuvres rather than travail. Nietzsche’s critique also, I think, impels us to 
analyze the different nationalist forms and historical models of the university 
in their own native traditions, not least in order to understand their colonial 
and post-colonial manifestations. Perhaps, more affirmatively, Nietzsche’s 
legacy offers some signposts for the future by steering us back, against the 
anti-traditionalism of modernity to ruminate over and question our historical 
sources of cultural renewal – not only Oxford, Paris and Bologna, but also 
Athens and Alexandria – that we might in future define different institutions 
upon a re-evaluation of old values, or new institutions out of different values.   
In this look back it is important to take stock of the contemporary 
discourse of Internationalization. Internationalization is a set of processes in 
search of a theory and/or concept of internationalism yet to be articulated. 
Internationalization most often figures as a discourse of strategy with an 
emphasis on “how to” questions rather than a reflective discourse examining 
political ends or purposes. Yet internationalization as a set of processes has 
changed over time, most recently reflecting changes in the political economy 
of higher education and the global economy. There are different forms of 
internationalization that differ according to colonial past, geopolitics, and 
global position so we should talk of “internationalizations” (in the plural). In 
this respect we might talk of internationalization before globalization. Inter- 
nationalization took place in the ancient world with first academies in 
Pakistan, India, Egypt, China and Persia (Takshashila, Nalanda, Al-Azhar, 
Yuelu, Gandishapur) in the 7th and 9th centuries BC that attracted students 
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from all over Asia and Middle East. The Academy was established by Plato 
in 387 BC (but remember also Kos, Rhodes and Alexandria) and traveling 
“itinerant” scholars – Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias) 
wandered about Greece teaching rhetoric. First wave of internationalization 
took place in Europe during the period of the establishment of the medieval 
university (Magnaura, 849; Salerno, 9th century; Bologna, 1088; Paris, 1100) 
and cathedral schools established by papal bull. 
Translation can be considered as a form of internationalization with 
spread of texts into Arabic during the “Golden Age” (750–950) of Muslim 
scholarship and into Latin with great revival of Greeks texts fueled by pro- 
liferation of texts from the East in 15th century Italy exerting an influence on 
16th century Britain. A history of internationalization in the ancient world 
needs to take into account a complex set of movements that emphasize the 
interrelationships between trade, conquest and traveling scholarship, includ- 
ing, for example, at the following moments: the Hellenization of Syria and 
the foundation of Gandishapur as a center of learning (how Greek science 
passed to the Arabic world); Christianity as a Hellenizing force and Christian 
Syriac writers, scholars, and scientists; the Nestorians and the Monophysites; 
the Indian influence, Alexandrian science, the sea route to north-west India 
and Buddhism as a possible medium spreading west; Khalifates of Damascus 
and Baghdad (762) and early Arabic translators (Abu Mahammad Ibn al-
Muqaffa’, Al-Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf Ibn Matar Al-Hasib, Yuhanna Ibn Batriq, 
‘Abd al-Masih Ibn ‘Aballah Wa’ima al-Himse, Abu Yahya al-Batriq, Jibra’il 
II, Abu Zakariah Yahya Ibn Masawaih) who translated Buddhist and Greek 
texts, including Euclid’s Elements, Aristotle’s Poetica, Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos, 
Galen’s texts etc. 
At the same time we must take account of the complex processes of 
colonization based on the export of the form of the university, resistance to 
the colonial form, and later not only indigenization of the university but also 
the indigenous university.1 How might the development and humanization of 
the new humanities – which grows out of a Eurocentric culture – and now is 
modulated according to the new keys of digitialization and virtualization (even 
as Derrida says “mondialization”), make room for the humanity of other cul- 
tures? How might such unconditionality of the university restyle the concept 
of man, add to the history of truth, and contribute to producing new events to 




1. I am thinking of the “Zapatista” University near San Cristobel in Chiapas I 
visited briefly in 2006 and also the Maori universities in Aotearoa/New Zealand. See, 
for instance, Te Whare Wananga o Awanuiarangi that carries a Mihi on its website 
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with the following “We commit ourselves to explore and define the depths of 
bicultural knowledge in Aotearoa – to enable us to rediscover ourselves, to know 
who we are, to know where we come from and to claim our own place in the 
millennium ahead. We take this journey of discovery, of reclamation of sovereignty; 
establishing the equality of Maori intellectual tradition alongside the knowledge 
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